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Thomas Friedman has recently informed us that, thanks to globalization, the world is 
flat but critics reply that the world is still very ‘spiky’ because of very real material, 
political, and cultural limits to globalization. Michael Porter continues to sell his high-
priced patent recipes for improving economic competitiveness around the world, 
whether to cities, regions, or nations but, as his contribution to the most recent 
World Economic Forum Report on ‘global competitiveness’ shows, boosting and 
maintaining competitiveness is an uncertain snakes and ladders game. Indeed 
critics dismiss competitiveness as a ‘dangerous obsession’ or as a never-ending 
treadmill that obliges one to run ever faster to avoid falling behind. Yet ‘globalization’ 
and ‘competitiveness’ remain two of the most powerful economic narratives today 
with massive effects on all our lives. They figure especially strongly in constant 
references to the challenges posed by India and China as increasingly competitive 
global players in services and manufactures respectively and the corresponding 
imperative for advanced western economies to face this challenge by becoming 
more skilled and even smarter. In this and other respects, such narratives seem to 
make sense of a hypercomplex and runaway world that defies ready comprehension 
by providing simple, flexible, and productively vague stories that connect past, 
present, and future as a basis for path-shaping action. 
 
Another master economic imaginary, which is closely linked to these two narratives, 
and also has a strong impact on economic strategies, state projects, and societal 
visions, is the knowledge-based economy or, more simply, the knowledge economy. 
It is now taken-for-granted that there is an accelerating transition to knowledge-
based economies on a global scale, that this transition is central to future growth 
prospects at all scales, and that promotion of conditions favourable to the 
knowledge-based economy is critical in the struggle for long-term competitive 
advantage and sustained prosperity in the world market. Indeed, official economic 
strategies at all levels – from towns, cities, and regions through national states to 
supranational bodies like the European Union and, finally, international institutions 
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and global regimes. This story is reinforced by the close links between the 
knowledge-based economy and other notions, like the information economy, 
learning economy, creative economy, and information society. But how valid is this 
account of the contemporary economy? What does it include and what does it 
exclude? Valid or not, how did this account become so powerful a master economic 
narrative or imaginary? Is the search for ever smarter and ever more goods and 
services occurring at the expense of respect for deeper truths and ultimate values? 
 
Real world economies cannot be comprehended in all their complexity in real time. 
This holds for any person or organization seeking to make sense of economic 
performance and economic change, whether as an interested stakeholder or a 
disinterested observer. This lack of omniscience (or even an understanding of what 
such knowledge requires) is one reason why liberals believe in the ‘invisible hand of 
the market’ and in keeping the state out of the economy. Alongside the invisible 
hand, however, we find competing models, metaphors, and descriptions for real 
world economies, especially when observed in their broader institutional settings 
and role in everyday life. The knowledge-based economy is just one of these 
models but is extraordinarily powerful in linking many apparently disparate changes 
and trends in the real world and, as such, whether rightly or wrongly, it also provides 
important guidelines in many fields of economic, political, and social practice. 
  
A master economic imaginary should satisfy two requirements. First, it can inform 
and shape economic strategies on all scales from the firm to the wider economy, on 
all territorial scales from the local through regional to the national or supra-national 
scale, and with regard to the operation and articulation of market forces and their 
non-market supports. And, second, it can inform and shape state projects and 
broader visions on different scales, providing guidance in the face of political and 
social uncertainty and providing a means to integrate private, institutional, and wider 
public narratives about past experiences, present difficulties, and future prospects. 
The more of these fields a new economic narrative can address, the more resonant 
and influential it will be. This explains the power of the ‘KBE’ as an increasingly 
dominant and hegemonic discourse that can frame broader struggles over political, 
intellectual and moral leadership on various scales as well as over more concrete 
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fields of technical and economic reform. Indeed, its resonance has much to do with 
its Rorschach Inkblot-like capacity to link different sets of ideal and material interests 
across a broad range of organizations, institutional orders, and everyday 
experience. The basic idea is being articulated on many scales from local to global, 
in many organizational and institutional sites from firms to states, in many functional 
systems, such as education, science, health, welfare, law, and politics, as well as 
the economy in its narrow sense, and in the public sphere and the lifeworld. It has 
been translated into many different visions and strategies (e.g., smart machines and 
expert systems, the creative industries, the increasing centrality of intellectual 
property, lifelong learning, the information society, or the rise of cyber-communities). 
The KBE can also be inflected in neo-liberal, neo-corporatist, neo-statist, and neo-
communitarian ways – witness the differences between the USA, Finland, 
Singapore, and counter-cultural movements like Linux, the open source movement, 
and so on. Indeed the power of the KBE narrative often seems to depend on 
productive ambiguities and misunderstandings to sustain alliances and 
institutionalized compromises among very disparate interests.  
 
The KBE narrative guides investment, economic strategies, and a wide range of 
government policies not only in advanced capitalist economies but also in the Asian 
dragon economies, China, India, Latin America, new EU member states, and 
elsewhere. In this sense it is also closely linked with stories about globalization and 
competitiveness. Its appeal is grounded in significant shifts in core technologies, the 
restructuring of advanced capitalist economies, new enterprise forms, new modes of 
competition, and so on. Whether it offers a scientifically adequate description of 
today’s economy in all its chaotic complexity and, just as importantly, whether it 
provides a sound basis for firm-level strategies and government policies, are quite 
different issues. For the moment, however, I focus on its undoubted power as a  
theoretical and policy paradigm and  the reasons for this. 
 
What’s so new about the KBE? 
 
Surely knowledge has always been important in every economy, especially in 
periods of major transformation. What is novel today is the growing reflexive 
application of knowledge to the production of economically useful knowledge; and 
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the increased treatment of knowledge as intellectual property. Given that all 
economies are knowledge economies, we need to reflect on why the KBE has 
become a master narrative. This is not a wholly innocent phenomenon. For, 
although it has material and ideological roots in 1960s debates on post-
industrialism, it gained momentum in the 1980s as American capitalists and state 
managers sought an effective reply to the growing competitiveness of European and 
East Asian rivals. Academic studies, think tank reports, and official inquiries 
indicated that the US economy was still competitive in key sectors associated with 
the 'KBE’. This research prompted a concerted campaign to develop the material 
and ideological basis for a new economic strategy based on deepening and 
widening the KBE and on the massive extension of intellectual property rights to 
protect and enlarge the dominance of US capital for the anticipated next long wave. 
This reflects a neo-liberal policy for productive capital that safeguards US super-
profits behind the cloak of free trade in intellectual property and so complements its 
neo-liberal policy for financial capital. The new strategy was translated into a 
successful hegemonic campaign (armoured by law and juridical precedents, 
dissemination of US technical standards and social norms of production and 
consumption, bilateral trade leverage, diplomatic arm-twisting, and bloody-minded 
unilateralism) to persuade other states to adopt the KBE agenda.  
 
The same problems confronting the USA in the 1970s now face the leading 
European economies, Japan, and Australasia. Their policy makers now embrace 
the same competitive logic of the ever-widening and prolongation of intellectual 
property rights and, wherever possible, investing in economic and, more importantly, 
extra-economic fields that bear on competitiveness in the KBE in the face of global 
competition. Close to home, in addition to New Labour policies, the European Union 
committed itself at the Lisbon Summit (2000) to becoming the most competitive 
knowledge-based economy in the world, compatible with maintaining the European 
social model. The same policies are being rolled out elsewhere by national states 
with different roles in the global division of labour (e.g., New Zealand, South Korea, 
Germany, and Colombia) as well as a wide range of provinces, metropolitan 
regions, and small cities. More significantly, they are heavily promoted by 
international agencies (notably the OECD and World Trade Organization but also 
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the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development) and by regional economic blocs and intergovernmental 
arrangements (e.g., the EU, APEC, ASEAN, NAFTA, and Mercosur, the Latin 
American trade bloc). Moreover, once accepted as the master narrative with all its 
nuances and scope for interpretation, it becomes easier for its neo-liberal variant to 
shape the development of the emerging global knowledge-based economy through 
the sheer weight of the US economy as well as through the exercise of economic, 
political, and intellectual domination.  
 
The premature harmonization of contradictions 
 
The KBE is often presented as a win-win solution for economic actors, political 
forces, citizens, and the environment. Knowledge is clearly better than ignorance; 
knowledge work is preferable to hard graft; the use-value of knowledge increases 
with its circulation; and so forth. But the enthusiastic embrace of the KBE disguises 
contradictions and conflicts that cast doubt on its universal social beneficence. A 
key site of contradictions in this regard is the tension between knowledge as a 
collectively generated resource (or intellectual commons) that produces most social 
benefit when it circulates freely and knowledge as an object that can be privately 
owned (as intellectual property) and thereby provide the basis for monopolistic 
rents. Indeed, in many respects, there is nothing inherently scarce about knowledge 
as a collectively produced collective resource and, whether or not all ‘knowledge 
wants to be free’, it is widely presumed that, as a ‘non-rival’ good, it should circulate 
freely within scientific communities, democratic polities, and, in the form of perfect 
information, in liberal market economies.  
 
Yet knowledge in various forms is increasingly subject to enclosure to turn it into a 
scarce commodity and this process of commodification generates in turn tendencies 
to market failure and other social problems that cannot be resolved by the market 
mechanism itself. This is expressed in various contradictions between knowledge as 
intellectual commons and as intellectual property. One sign of this is the private 
expropriation of the collectively produced knowledge of past generations. The most 
notorious example of this enclosure of the intellectual commons is the appropriation 
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of indigenous, tribal, or peasant 'culture' in the form of undocumented, informal, and 
collective knowledge, expertise, and other intellectual resources and its wholly or 
largely unremunerated transformation into commodified knowledge (documented, 
formal, private) by commercial enterprises. Bio-piracy is the most notorious example 
but actually just one of many. Another form of appropriation of knowledge more 
familiar in advanced economies is the divorce of skilled and/or intellectual labour 
from control over the means of production that it deploys – this is achieved through 
its formalization and codification in smart machines and expert systems – and over 
the creative products that it produces – achieved in part through contracts for ‘work 
for hire’ that appropriate creativity for the benefit of the employer. A third example is 
the growing pressure for the commodification of publicly-financed research in 
universities and research institutes along with the denigration and shrinking of 
academic research that is not self-evidently ‘commercial’. More generally, this 
contradiction is reflected in the tendency for each capital to want free access to 
information, knowledge, and expertise whilst wishing to charge for the information, 
knowledge, and expertise that it itself can supply. 
 
Other contradictions are grounded in the growing interdependence among the 
economic and extra-economic factors making for competitiveness in a world market. 
This has two faces. First, whereas market pressures in a world of shareholder 
capitalism encourage short-term economic horizons, sustainable competitiveness 
depends on social capital, trust, and communities of learning and the cultivation of 
entrepreneurial cities, enterprise culture, and enterprising subjects – conditions that 
take years to build but can soon be destroyed. Second, since innovation draws on 
the intellectual commons and often involves polycentric, multi-scalar, and multi-actor 
networks within and beyond the economy in its narrow sense, it is hard to 
distinguish between the origin and value of contributions to knowledge-intensive, 
design-intensive, or creative goods or services. This can encourage cooperation but 
it can also engender conflict over division of the spoils or even block innovation. 
 
The treadmill of competition in the KBE intensifies pressures on firms, regions, or 
production systems to stay ahead of their competitors so that ever-renewed 
technological rents and increasing market share can alleviate the normal tendency 
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for super-profits to be competed away or invented around. It also encourages 
attempts to protect vulnerable monopolies in knowledge or information by 
embedding them in technology, standards, tacit knowledge, or legally entrenched 
intellectual property rights. Another effect is that less competitive sectors and 
regions in the KBE must secure below average profits and incomes, leading to 
unequal exchange and uneven development, especially where neo-liberalism and 
its competitive race to the bottom are dominant. 
State Intervention 
  
States at different scales have key roles in promoting the KBE and managing the 
effects of the competitive treadmill and uneven development. They have reoriented 
policies towards competitive knowledge production and seek to reorganize not 
merely economies but whole societies around these imperatives, so that sectors 
previously considered extra-economic are now deemed crucial to long-term 
competitiveness. Initially this largely reflected views about the sources of economic 
advantage in dynamic Asian economies, beginning with the developmental state in 
Japan, then the East Asian tigers, and, most recently, China and India. These views 
have since been reinforced by the growing recognition that our newer Asian 
competitors are also actively embracing and pursuing KBE strategies, threatening 
not only to dominate mature manufacturing and service sectors but also to catchup 
and even overtake less dynamic western economies in knowledge-, design- and 
creativity-intensive sectors. The same lessons were being learnt earlier, of course, 
through reflections on competitive regions like Silicon Valley or competitive 
countries like Finland. Given their different positions within the world market, states 
tend to polarise, firstly, around interests in protecting or enclosing the commons 
(e.g., North-South) and, secondly, around the most appropriate forms of intellectual 
property rights and regimes on different scales from global to local. Some states are 
more active than others in promoting the primitive accumulation of intellectual 
property, in privatising public knowledge, and in commoditising all forms of 
knowledge; others are more concerned to protect the intellectual commons, to 
promote the information society, and to develop social capital.  
 
 9 
A socially optimal policy of investment in knowledge is hard to establish. In many 
cases this is perhaps best achieved through state promotion of innovation and 
diffusion systems (including social capital), broad forms of 'technological foresight', 
co-involvement and/or negotiated 'guidance' of the production of knowledge, and the 
development of suitable governance structures for a networked, transnational world. 
This is reflected in the state sponsorship of information infrastructures and social 
innovation systems on different scales; in the development of intellectual property 
rights regimes and new forms of governance and/or regulation for activities in 
cyberspace; and in the development of new forms of infrastructure suited to a 
knowledge-based economy rather than an era of mass production and mass 
consumption. More generally, economic policy is increasingly oriented to promoting 
innovation, competitiveness, and flexibility for the next long wave of economic 
expansion. Full employment and planning have been demoted in favour of full 
employability and entrepreneurship. Social policy gives less emphasis to universal 
welfare rights and more to active labour market policies and to targeting social 
exclusion. Many policies previously considered as, at best, only indirectly relevant to 
economic performance have been redefined as critical for competitiveness and this 
makes it harder for states to reconcile their responses to ever more insistent 
economic imperatives with the more general demands of securing general political 
legitimacy and social cohesion. One reaction to this is to rely less on state action to 
compensate for market failure and to rely more on private-public partnerships, civil 




The KBE cannot be adequately understood by regarding knowledge as another 
factor of production alongside land, labour, and capital that has somehow suddenly 
become more important in economic organization. Discovery of the ‘knowledge 
economy’ reflects instead a shift in master economic narratives in response to the 
1970s crisis of the post-war model of national economic growth based on mass 
production and mass consumption. It identifies new sources of competitive 
advantage in a capitalist world market, encourages the treatment of knowledge as if 
it were a naturally scarce resource, and transforms the relationship between 
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economic and extra-economic competitiveness. This leads to the importance of life-
long learning, the global war for talents, the promotion of creativity, the 
subordination of university teaching and research to economic imperatives, and the 
evaluation of welfare state expenditure in terms of its contribution (or otherwise) to 
international competition. The growing commodification of knowledge intensifies 
contradictions between the circulation of knowledge as a collective resource (the 
intellectual commons) and its appropriation as a source of private profit (whether as 
de facto or de jure intellectual property). In short, while the expansion and circulation 
of knowledge holds out the promise of emancipation, in its commodified form it can 
reinforce subordination to the treadmill of capitalist competition and unending 
pressure for economic growth, with harmful effects on humankind that are becoming 
ever more evident in climate change as well as economic and social exclusion.  
 
Accepting these limits to a capitalist knowledge economy, we should seek to embed 
nature and human creativity in a re-moralized society. It is therefore tempting to call 
for a knowledge-based society to replace the KBE. But, if we accept that not all 
knowledge is good (faster cars, better weapons of mass destruction, more effective 
means of torture, etc.), then the search for knowledge must be subordinated to 
higher imperatives. Thus I conclude that it would be better to replace the 
knowledge-based economy with a wisdom-based society that draws on the 
collective good sense as well as accumulated knowledge of humankind. This is 
reflected in the wise words that are wrongly attributed to Chief Seattle of the Cree 
Indians but nonetheless indicate the limits of commodification:  
 
Only after the last tree has been cut down 
Only after the last river has been poisoned 
Only after the last fish has been caught 
Only then you will find out that money cannot be eaten 
 
 
